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A FRAUDULENT SENSE OF BELONGING:
THE CASE FOR REMOVING THE
‘FALSE CLAIM TO CITIZENSHIP’
By: Anne Parsons 1
I. Introduction
I have been a permanent resident for about 10
years. When I decided to apply for US citizenship
I realized that I might be ineligible because when
applying for my ﬁrst driver’s license I also became
registered to vote. At the time, I did not understand
that permanent residents are not allowed to vote. The
fact that a governmental ofﬁcial asked me to register
(even though at that point my greencard was my only
ofﬁcial ID) and actual issuance of a registration
card made me even more ensured [sic] that I am
an eligible voter. If I recall correctly, the Election
Day was shortly after and I am almost positive that
I voted during these elections. However, soon later,
when talking with another greencard holder I was
informed that I am not eligible to vote. Since that
point on, I never voted and whenever asked if I wish
to register I make a point to inform those who ask
that “as a permanent resident I am not eligible.”
Other than that, my record is perfectly clean. Do
I still have a chance to become naturalized? Is
it truly a deportable offense? Is there a way, and
should I try to ﬁnd out whether I actually voted?
There must be more people who made the same
mistake as I did, is there a way to ﬁnd out what
percentage is denied citizenship on similar grounds?2
A little known fact in U.S. history is that noncitizens3
once had the right to vote in local, state, and even national
elections.4 Today, not only are noncitizens largely prohibited
from voting, except in a few local jurisdictions, noncitizens may
lose their chance to become citizens, and face the additional
threats of deportation and criminal sanctions for voting or
merely registering to vote. While noncitizens have always
faced consequences for fraud or willful misrepresentation
of a material fact under the Immigration and Nationality Act
(“INA”),5 the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 19966 (commonly known as “IIRIRA”
or “IIRAIRA”) changed the law in several ways, including by
adding speciﬁc grounds of inadmissibility and removability
related to voting in any local, state, or federal election.7
This paper criticizes IIRIRA’s addition of the “false
claim to citizenship” provision to regulate noncitizen voting
as inconsistent with the proper role of immigration law
in creating and deﬁning the body politic. Part I explores
democratic concepts of citizenship in the context of
4

noncitizen voting rights. This view of citizenship as political
voice and belonging, however, must inevitably confront the
perceived imperative of the modern nation-state to create
legal distinctions between citizens and non-citizens. Part I
then explores how the U.S. does so by examining theories
underlying the naturalization process and looking speciﬁcally
at how “citizenship” is deﬁned in current U.S. immigration law.
Part II brieﬂy examines the connection between
immigration policy and the gradual erosion of noncitizen
voting rights as a backdrop to IIRIRA’s creation of the
“false claim to citizenship” provisions. In Part III, the paper
argues that the IIRIRA amendments to the “false claim to
citizenship” provisions have several negative consequences.
First, the provisions risk unnecessarily excluding or
deporting viable candidates for citizenship, including longtime legal permanent residents (“LPRs”) like the individual
in the epitaph. Second, these provisions validate unfounded
concerns about noncitizen voter fraud, thereby further
polarizing the immigration debate in unproductive ways. And
third, the provisions are inconsistent with the underlying goals
of the naturalization process, and jeopardize noncitizens’
opportunity for meaningful political participation.
The paper concludes by suggesting various ways
the false claim to citizenship provisions could be reformed,
arguing that removing the immigration consequences
for noncitizens who vote is most in line with democratic
ideals. It calls upon immigrants’ advocates to reconsider
arguments for extending voting rights to noncitizens
in light of predicted demographic change and the
growing push for Comprehensive Immigration Reform.
II. What Makes a Citizen?
The legal deﬁnition of “citizen” is “a person
who, by either birth or naturalization, is a member of a
political community, owing allegiance to the community and
being entitled to enjoy all its civil rights and protections.”8
Constitutional democracies are premised on the notion
of consent by the governed, with the vote serving as the
primary mechanism through which members of the polity
realize democratic ideals.9 All democracies index insiders
and outsiders based on existing members’ collective notions
of who constitutes “the people.” If formal citizenship
is the marker of membership in the political community,
this means that in a democracy, noncitizens are governed
by the laws but do not have a formal voice. 10 Why and
how is formal citizenship taken into account in deﬁning
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the potential to lead to a more radical conclusion: that all
noncitizens with presence and a signiﬁcant stake in their
communities should have a voice in all those communities
in which they participate, whether local, state, or national.22
Theoretically speaking, however, a democracy is
a. Citizenship as Political Voice and Belonging
not obligated to extend suffrage to noncitizens.23 The U.S.
Constitution does not deny noncitizens the right to vote, 24
Today, with a few exceptions,11 formal citizenship is yet arguably neither does it require it.25 Whether a nationthe primary marker of an individual’s inclusion or exclusion state chooses to extend the vote to noncitizens might depend
in the body politic in the U.S.12 Despite the fact that certain on that particular state’s constitutional values in relation
classes of noncitizens, LPRs in particular, share many to noncitizens.26 The more constitutional protections
a state grants to noncitizens, the
characteristics with citizens—they pay
taxes, own property, and serve in the
more important it becomes for
armed forces—only citizens can vote. the effect of immigration law in deﬁning citizens to maintain the vote as a
And yet, this has not always been the case.
distinguishing and exclusive right.27
the body politic has become
In his socio-historical account
Correspondingly, the more courts
increasingly important
of noncitizen voting rights in the
extend to noncitizens the rights to due
U.S., Maryland State Senator and Law
process, free speech, and association,
Professor Jamin Raskin, notes that the
the less crucial the vote is for ensuring
extension of voting rights to noncitizens by states stemmed noncitizens’ political voice and sense of belonging.28 As
from a strong federalist paradigm.13 Depending on the time one scholar points out, this may explain why “[noncitizen]
period, states had different reasons for allowing noncitizens suffrage is, at once, insigniﬁcant and central” in the U.S.29
to vote.14 In the eighteenth century, states extended the
right to vote to propertied, white, male noncitizens both
b. Citizenship as Membership in a Nation-State
because they exhibited those attributes most valued in
electors, and because doing so allowed states to justify
In today’s world of increased border restrictions,
the exclusion of people without those attributes from the effect of immigration law in deﬁning the body politic
the ballot by delinking citizenship from the franchise.15 has become increasingly important.30 The increasing
Later, in the nineteenth century, states used the franchise overlap between immigration, criminal, and national
primarily to draw noncitizens to settle in their territory.16 security law has greatly enhanced the gate-keeping function
Raskin derives three interrelated normative of immigration law in the U.S.31 As a prime symbol of
arguments for alien suffrage based on state’s express or these conceptual overlaps, IIRIRA’s amendments to the
implied rationales for allowing noncitizens to vote. First, Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) signiﬁcantly
doing so logically follows from the democratic ideal of expanded the exclusionary function of immigration law.
“citizenship as presence,” in that extending the right to
Historically, immigration law played a minimal role
vote to noncitizens merely recognizes those individuals’ in regulating noncitizen voting rights, which instead were
participation in the social life of the community.17 Second, regulated by state election laws. Generally, laws that govern
allowing noncitizens to vote serves the practical function of the lives of noncitizens already living in the U.S. are termed
assimilating them to local values, a rationale Raskin terms “alienage laws,” as distinct from immigration laws which
“citizenship as integration.”18 A third and similar rationale, determine who has the right to be present in the ﬁrst place.32
“citizenship as standing,” reconstitutes the vote as a form In the U.S., both alienage laws that restrict noncitizens’ right
of public acknowledgement that noncitizens belong in to vote, and immigration laws that delineate the grounds of
American society.19 The latter two rationales provide strong inclusion and exclusion, play a role in deﬁning the body politic.
justiﬁcation for extending the vote to individuals who intend In comparison, in countries such as New Zealand that allow
to naturalize. Although current U.S. immigration law does not noncitizens to vote in national elections, immigration laws
explicitly distinguish between those who intend to become alone deﬁne the people.33 In reality, alienage and immigration
citizens and those who do not, LPR status is the closest laws often overlap,34 but they remain nonetheless analytically
proxy even though LPRs are not required to naturalize. Not distinct.35 For example, alienage laws often receive strict
surprisingly, serious arguments have been made that LPRs scrutiny by the courts,36 while Congress retains plenary
should be able to vote at the local level,20 and a few localities power over immigration law.37 Though both types of laws
in the U.S. have extended the franchise to this group.21 play a role in deﬁning the electorate, essentially, this paper
Serious consideration of the ﬁrst rationale, however, has argues that using immigration law, rather than alienage law,
the body politic? In its reference to naturalization, the
deﬁnition of citizenship hints at another fundamental
question: how do nations, and the U.S. in particular,
determine who becomes a citizen in the ﬁrst place?
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to regulate noncitizen voting undermines the democratic presumption of equal rights.51 Only when an immigrant
ideals the immigration system should seek to promote.38 expresses her intention not to naturalize would that person
A society’s immigration statutes reﬂect its lose her citizen-like rights.52 While not erasing the distinction
perception of how the process of national self-deﬁnition between lawful immigrant and citizen completely, the
should take place. Conversely, whether and how a society view of immigration as transition would tend to support
permits noncitizens to vote depends on that society’s voting rights for intending citizens. Motomura argues
ideas about how the integration of
that, historically, the concept of
noncitizens should occur.39 According the more the law prioritizes a person’s ties transition played an important role.
to Immigration Scholar and Historian to the U.S., the less important formal In particular, he points to declarations
Hiroshi Motomura, U.S. immigration
of intent to naturalize, a feature of
citizenship becomes as a means of
law is a blend of three competing
U.S. immigration law from 1795 to
gaining rights.
views of immigration: immigration
1952, which could be ﬁled by eligible
as contract, immigration as afﬁliation,
noncitizens several years in advance
and immigration as transition.40 Each view reﬂects a model of a naturalization application, and which elevated the
of justice based on differing notions of the relative equality noncitizen to a pre-citizen status.53 For Motomura, the history
between citizens and noncitizens. Under the contract of transition and its emphasis on inclusion is an antidote
theory, citizens and noncitizens are not equal.41 Lawful to the logic of the other two concepts, which pervades
immigrants have the right to remain in the U.S. only so long the U.S.’s increasingly restrictive immigration policies.54
as they obey the rules.42 For Motomura, contract theory
is inadequate as an exclusive foundation for immigration
c. Citizenship in U.S. Immigration Law
law because the contract is one-sided—the immigrant
must take it or leave it.43 This violates the requirement
If immigration law plays a role in deﬁning the body
of consent underlying modern democratic politics.44 politic, citizenship and naturalization are the primary means
Afﬁliation is the second conceptual foundation by which it does so. People gain citizenship by birth in the
and serves as immigration law’s counterpart to Raskin’s U.S.,55 through naturalization,56 or in limited cases, by blood.57
notion of “citizenship as integration.”
Viewing The naturalization process in the U.S. has traditionally been
immigration as afﬁliation means that the longer that characterized as easy or open by international standards, which
lawful immigrants remain in the U.S., the more citizen- reﬂects the importance of naturalization as a governmental
like rights they gain.45 Paradoxically, the more the law objective.58 In other words, the U.S. government can justify
prioritizes a person’s ties to the U.S., the less important retaining a ﬁrm citizen/noncitizen distinction as an incentive
formal citizenship becomes as a means of gaining rights.46 for people to naturalize, so long as it compensates by making
One form of relief in U.S. immigration law that seems the transition to citizenship a relatively quick process.59
to reﬂect the afﬁliation concept is cancellation of removal.
Very generally, to qualify for citizenship,
Cancellation of removal is a form of relief that allows naturalization applicants must have lived in the U.S.
noncitizens who are otherwise inadmissible or deportable for at least ﬁve years as an LPR,60 or three years if they
to stay in the U.S. based, in part, on their length of residence are spouses of U.S. citizens.61 Applicants must meet a
in the country and other equities including the presence of minimum period of physical presence in the U.S.,62 in
family, property, or business ties. 47 In general, Motomura addition to demonstrating “good moral character.”63
sees current U.S. immigration law as a blend of the contract
In practice, the transition to citizenship is easy for
48
and afﬁliation theories. While the rationale for cancellation many people, and the denial rate is relatively low.64 Still,
of removal recognizes the inherent unfairness in severing denial rates do not account for those who fail to apply out
an individual’s ties to the U.S., in reality, the law also contains of fear of being denied. Many potential citizens ﬁnd the
an element of contract. To be eligible for cancellation of English and civics requirements insurmountable obstacles.
removal, for example, both LPRs and other noncitizens Others may not be able to pay the $675 application fee.
(“non-LPRs”) must prove that they have not committed Still others may not apply out of fear that past crimes
certain types of crimes.49 It is also worth mentioning, though or violations of immigration law will lead to a denial, or
perhaps not surprising, that the law as applied to non-LPRs even deportation. With IIRIRA’s dramatic expansion
includes more stringent “contractual terms” in addition to of the grounds for inadmissibility to, and removal
requiring a longer period of residence to establish eligibility.50 from, the U.S., these fears have gained new currency.
In contrast to the ﬁrst two views, immigration
as transition means that all lawful immigrants are treated
as potential citizens upon entry and thus beneﬁt from a
6
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III. From Suffrage to “Falsely Claiming Citizenship”
b. IIRIRA: A Fraudulent Sense of Belonging?
a. Restrictive Immigration and the Erosion of Noncitizen Voting
Rights
An undeniable correlation exists between U.S.
immigration policy and noncitizen voting rights.65
Noncitizens voted and held local ofﬁce throughout the
colonies beginning as early as 1692.66 The extension of
voting rights to noncitizens in the U.S. occurred during a
period of relatively open immigration. During the early
colonial period, the federal government left the regulation
of immigration, including alien suffrage, largely to the
states.67 Its ﬁrst attempt to create uniformity among the
states came with the passing of the 1790 Naturalization
Act, which regulated who could become a U.S. citizen.68
The federal government only began to centralize
control of immigration in the late nineteenth century.
Not surprisingly, throughout history, “the rise and
fall of xenophobic and nationalist tendencies” has greatly
impacted both immigration law and immigrant voting
rights.69 During the War of 1812, for example, increasing
suspicion of non-English immigrants decreased popular
support for noncitizen voting, 70 though voting rights
expanded again in the years leading up to the Civil War.71 At
the height of noncitizen voting in 1875, twenty-two states
and territories had extended the franchise to noncitizens.72
Beginning that same year, however, the U.S. government
passed a series of exclusion laws due in part to the inﬂux of
Chinese immigrants.73 As anti-immigrant sentiment began
to rise around the turn of the century, states one by one
terminated voting rights for noncitizens.74 The ﬁnal end to
noncitizen suffrage roughly coincides with the end of World
War I,75 which also put an end to unlimited immigration
and led to the creation of a nation-origins quota system.76
Even though the U.S. government eventually
centralized control over immigration matters, it did not seek
to regulate noncitizen voting. In fact, the government did
not create a provision barring entry for misrepresentation,
the statutory precursor to IIRIRA’s false claims provisions,
until after World War II.77 In 1952, the drafters of the
INA supported incorporation of the misrepresentation
provision into the permanent statute as an anti-communist
measure.78 Initially, the INA’s provisions related to false
claims were narrowly drawn: noncitizens were only guilty
of making a false claim to citizenship if the claim was
made to a U.S. government ofﬁcial for the purpose of
securing admission into the U.S.79 The 1986 Immigration
Marriage Fraud Amendments80 signiﬁcantly strengthened
the fraud provisions, but continued to limit their application
to noncitizens who made material representation
for the purpose of receiving immigration beneﬁts.81
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These provisions changed again for the worse in 1996
when President Clinton signed IIRIRA into law. IIRIRA
closely followed another piece of legislation, the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 199682 (“AEDPA”), which
was enacted one year after the Oklahoma City bombing
to combat domestic and international terrorism. IIRIRA,
on the other hand, focused on illegal immigration reform.
According to former INS General Counsel, Paul W. Virtue,
IIRIRA represented the culmination of
immigration-reform efforts that began with
the Republican Party assuming majority
control of the House and Senate in 1994.
Congress was faced with the task of trying
to strengthen our national security in the
wake of the 1992 terrorist attacks on the
World Trade Center, while at the same time,
trying to ﬁnd a way to discourage illegal
migration. What had started as separate
bills, one designed to reduce the annual
number of family and employment-based
immigrants to the United States
(legal immigration) and the other designed
to address border security and deportation
issues (illegal immigration), were combined
in each house and then split again due to
a concerted grass-roots lobbying effort.
Separated from the more popular illegalimmigration bills, the legal-immigration
measures were defeated in both houses.83
Although Congress rejected the proposed bill on
restrictions for “legal immigration,” many of IIRIRA’s
provisions, including those related to noncitizen voting,
have nonetheless affected authorized immigrants.84
Few of IIRIRA’s sixty-plus provisions are immigrantfriendly. To achieve its goal of curbing unauthorized
immigration, IIRIRA strengthened border security, initiated
the border fence project, added three and ten-year bars to readmission for immigration violators, tightened eligibility for
cancellation of removal, streamlined removal proceedings
for certain classes of immigrants, and severely restricted
judicial review.85 The legislation also instituted electronic
employment veriﬁcation pilot programs, and removed
public beneﬁts for most undocumented immigrants while
tightening eligibility restrictions for lawful immigrants.86
Similarly, AEDPA and IIRIRA both expanded
the criminal and non-criminal grounds of inadmissibility
and removal.87
IIRIRA also broadened the fraud
7

provisions of the INA and made penalties more stringent provisions were meant to appease those voters who believe
to support efforts to curb unauthorized immigration that politicians should not pander to noncitizens who cannot
at the border and in the workplace.88 IIRIRA added a vote anyway, though this is merely speculation. Whatever
ground of inadmissibility, which effectively extended the the reason, as discussed below, the impact of the provisions
applicability of the general misrepresentation ground to clearly falls hardest on legal immigrants, speciﬁcally those
false claims of citizenship made to private employers.89 applying to adjust status and legal permanent residents.
It also added a comparable ground of removability90 and
made it a crime to make a false claim of citizenship.91 IV. The Negative Consequences of an Illogical
Even though the general false claim to citizenship
Punishment
provisions could technically encompass unlawful voting
by immigrants, Congress added parallel provisions to
a. Immigration Consequences of Falsely Claiming Citizenship
deal speciﬁcally with that issue. Section 347 of IIRIRA
creates new grounds of inadmissibility and removal for
Although noncitizens are prohibited from voting
noncitizens who vote in violation of “any Federal, State, in all federal, and most state and local elections, registering
or local constitutional provisions, statute, ordinance, or to vote as a noncitizen is fairly easy and many noncitizens
regulation.”92 Though section 347 technically only applies may do so inadvertently. The National Voter Registration
to noncitizens who have actually voted, a noncitizen who Act of 1993100 (also known as the “Motor Voter Act”)
unlawfully registers to vote may also be inadmissible or requires states to provide individuals with the opportunity
removable under the broad “any purpose” language of the to register to vote when they apply for or renew their
general false claim to citizenship provisions.93 In contrast to driver’s license.101 Only ﬁfteen states require documentary
the unlawful voting provisions, the false claim provisions do proof of citizenship at the Department of Motor Vehicles
not require a ﬁnding that the individual violated underlying (“DMV”).102 Many states simply require the driver’s license
election law, only that the person falsely represented herself applicant or the DMV clerk to check a box to indicate the
as a U.S. citizen on or after September 30, 1996 for the individual’s citizenship status.103 Other states do not require
purpose of registering to vote or voting.94 Unlike the any proof of citizenship.104 DMV employees routinely ask
general false claims provisions, the provisions that apply driver’s license applicants whether they would like to register
speciﬁcally to unlawful voting are applicable retroactively.95 to vote and do not have to verify that the person is actually
Interestingly, IIRIRA creates two separate criminal eligible to vote.105 Noncitizens asked by a governmental
penalties for unlawful voting. Section 216 makes noncitizen ofﬁcial may assume they are eligible. Similarly, communityvoting in federal elections a general intent crime, punishable based organizations and voter registration campaigns may
by ﬁne and/or one year prison
also encourage noncitizens to vote.
sentence.96 In addition, IIRIRA further
Lastly, in contrast to the ﬁrst two
Only ﬁfteen states require documentary situations in which the noncitizen
provides that knowingly making a false
proof of citizenship at the
statement or claim to vote or register
registers inadvertently, the possibility
Department
of
Motor
Vehicles
to vote in any Federal, state, or local
exists that some noncitizens knowingly,
election constitutes a felony punishable
and
without
encouragement,
97
by ﬁne and/or ﬁve years in prison.
register
to
vote
and
vote.
In 2000, the Child Citizenship Act98 (“CCA”) added an
The above scenarios raise a key question—the issue
exception to the inadmissibility, removability, criminal of intent. The provisions that speciﬁcally address unlawful
prosecution, and ﬁnding of lack of good moral character voting do not explicitly require intent. If a noncitizen
provisions related to false claims to citizenship and unlawful votes in violation of federal, state, or local election law, that
voting, but it is extremely limited in its application.99 individual may be found inadmissible or removable under
Given Congress’s addition of speciﬁc and undeniably these provisions.106 Intent does come into play, however, in
harsh provisions to deal with noncitizen voting, this was the determination of whether the noncitizen violated election
presumably an issue of major concern. The legislative law by voting if the election statute requires a showing of
history, however, is silent on these provisions. On one speciﬁc intent. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”)
hand, their addition makes sense given Congress’s general policy guidelines clarify that in cases where the underlying
intent to curb fraud with the enactment of IIRIRA. On election law requires a ﬁnding of speciﬁc intent, adjudicating
the other hand, the provisions do not even loosely relate to ofﬁcers must assess the circumstances surrounding
the prevention of unauthorized immigration—the prospect the voting accordingly.107 If the ofﬁcer determines the
of voting in U.S. elections is not likely a main reason that individual knowingly violated the relevant election law,
people cross the border without authorization. Perhaps the the individual is removable subject to the ofﬁcer’s exercise
8
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of prosecutorial discretion.108 If there is no evidence of
speciﬁc intent and the statute requires such a showing, then
presumably the individual cannot be deemed removable.
It is less clear whether an individual can be deemed
inadmissible or removable absent a showing of intent
under the general provisions, which apply to false claims
of citizenship for any purpose or beneﬁt under state or
Federal law.109 The answer may hinge on the meaning of
“false” in the context of these provisions, a question which,
to date, no courts have addressed. One citizenship expert
suggested conﬂicting interpretations of the provision
based on two distinct meanings of “false.”110 A court may
construe the provision as embodying an intent requirement
based on the common understanding that false implies
“intentionally untrue.”111 On the other hand, a court may
construe Congress’s use of “falsely claiming” as an attempt
to distinguish this provision from adjacent ones dealing
with fraud and misrepresentation.112 The former provision
would clearly result in fewer immigration consequences
for noncitizens who are charged with inadmissibility
or removability under the false claims provisions,113
but for the moment, there is little indication how the
immigration agencies are actually implementing them.
The fact that a noncitizen voted or registered to
vote may become relevant at four points: application for
a nonimmigrant visa, application for relief from removal,
adjustment of status, and naturalization. It is unclear if
and how the various immigration agencies’ policies for
handling noncitizen voting issues differ, and whether some
agencies go to greater lengths than others to determine
whether a noncitizen has unlawfully voted or registered to
vote. Still, the following discussion outlines the provisions’
potential to negatively impact noncitizens at each stage.
i. Application for Nonimmigrant Visa
The provision may impact “nonimmigrants,” a legal
term used to designate noncitizens whose presence in the
U.S. is authorized on a temporary basis.114 A nonimmigrant
visa applicant who violates the false claims or unlawful
voter provisions can apply for a waiver.115 An otherwise
inadmissible applicant may only be granted admission
as a temporary nonimmigrant at the discretion of the
Attorney General.116 To qualify for a nonimmigrant visa,
however, most applicants must demonstrate that they do
not intend to stay in the United States.117 An individual
who has previously voted or registered to vote in the U.S.
will likely have a hard time convincing a consular ofﬁce
that she does not have the intention of staying.118 Thus,
in most circumstances the waiver will mean very little.
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ii. Adjustment of Status
Under the INA, adjustment of status is treated
as an admission to the U.S. 119 Thus, if a noncitizen
becomes inadmissible as result of making a false claim
to citizenship for the purpose of voting or registering to
vote, or voting unlawfully, this will bar her from adjusting
her status to permanent residence.120 While there is a
waiver available for immigrants who are inadmissible under
the general misrepresentation provision, 121 there are no
waivers available for those who are found inadmissible as
a result of false claims to citizenship or unlawful voting.122
Currently, it is unclear how aggressively DHS
checks whether an applicant has registered to vote at
the adjustment of status stage. There are no questions
pertaining to unlawful voting on the adjustment of status
application.123 Still, some applicants have been denied on
these grounds.124 Regardless, given the increasing integration
of government databases, a mere change in policy
could make screening of this kind routine procedure. 125
iii. Relief from Removal
If a noncitizen is found removable as a result of
voting-related violations, she can still apply for relief from
removal. Unlawful voting or a false claim to citizenship
can affect eligibility for relief in several ways. First, if the
individual is in exclusion proceedings and the violation
constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude, the individual
will be statutorily barred from applying for non-LPR
cancellation of removal.126 DHS has determined that a
conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1015(f), the speciﬁc intent
provision, constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude.127
There do not appear to be any cases challenging this
designation, perhaps because convictions for knowingly
making a false statement or claim to vote or register to vote
are rare. In the same policy statement, DHS indicates that a
conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 611, the general intent provision,
likely do not constitute a crime involving moral turpitude.128
Interestingly, if a noncitizen were found to have been
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude as a result of
unlawful voting or false claims to citizenship, theoretically
that individual could apply for a discretionary waiver,129 even
though there is no way to directly waive the false claim to
citizenship or unlawful voting grounds of inadmissibility.
If the individual is in removal proceedings, rather than
exclusion proceedings, false claims to citizenship constitute
an independent bar to non-LPR cancellation of removal.130
Second, even if the conviction does not constitute a
crime involving moral turpitude a violation may preclude an
individual from establishing good moral character, a statutory
requirement for certain forms of relief such as non-LPR
9

cancellation of removal and voluntary departure.131 Any
two or more convictions, regardless of whether the offenses
involve moral turpitude, can preclude a ﬁnding of good
moral character if the aggregate sentences to conﬁnement
were ﬁve years or more.132 Additionally, conﬁnement to a
penal institution for 180 days or more bars a ﬁnding of good
moral character.133 An individual can only avoid the bar if he
or she met the narrow exception established by the CCA.134
Lastly, even in the absence of a criminal conviction,
a violation negatively factors into the discretionary
analysis accompanying many applications for relief
including asylum, voluntary departure, and both LPR
and non-LPR cancellation of removal. For noncitizens
who lack strong equities, voting or registering to vote,
could be a deciding factor in a denial of relief, depending
on the immigration judge. Further, many types of
discretionary decisions are not subject to judicial review.135

claims determine the outcome of an application because
DHS does not publish statistics of its denial rate speciﬁc
to these grounds. It is equally impossible to tell how many
LPRs do not ﬁle applications for fear that they will be denied.
The lack of immigrant waiver and very limited exception
means the laws will have the hardest impact on applicants
at the adjustment of status and naturalization stages, in
other words, the most viable candidates for citizenship.
b. Polarizing the Immigration Debate

Immigration law deﬁnes the body politic “by
establishing a ladder of accession to permanent residence
and then formal U.S. citizenship.”144 The immigration
debate focuses on what set of criteria a noncitizen must
be required to meet before her inclusion into the body
politic.145 Although lawmakers may have rational reasons
for withholding voting rights for noncitizens,146 it does
iv. Naturalization
not follow that it is thus rational or necessary to deny
immigration beneﬁts to and potentially deport noncitizens
The provisions’ biggest impact is likely to be at the who vote or register to vote in violation of election law.
naturalization stage. After IIRIRA, all ofﬁcers conducting
Congress enacted IIRIRA in response to the
naturalization interviews are required to ask the applicant if growing fears over “illegal immigration.”147 Ironically,
she has ever voted or registered to vote in any election in the since the enactment of IIRIRA, immigration experts
United States.136 In addition, the application for naturalization have criticized the legislation on the grounds that it has
was amended to include questions related to false claims contributed to an increase in the number of unauthorized
and voting.137 If the individual violated relevant election immigrants in the U.S.148 It is no coincidence that IIRIRA
law or made a false claim to citizenship when registering to passed shortly after AEDPA, which Congress enacted
vote or voting, and the applicant does not qualify for one primarily to combat the threat of international terrorism.
of the CCA exceptions, the adjudicator’s decision to initiate Advocates and academics alike have decried the increasingly
removal proceeding is one of prosecutorial discretion.138 frequent discursive linkages made by lawmakers between
If the adjudicator decides that the case merits illegal immigration, crime, and terrorism as a sort of fearprosecutorial discretion, the adjudicator must still make a mongering.149 While the rule of law and national security are
good moral character ﬁnding.139 If a
undeniably of utmost importance to all
Immigration
law
deﬁnes
the
body
politic
noncitizen has actually been convicted
members of a society, the negative
under either of the voting related “by establishing a ladder of accession consequences of this rhetoric are
provisions, then the same analysis to permanent residence and then formal clear: an increasingly polarized, and
outlined above applies.140
In the
oftentimes vitriolic, immigration debate.
U.S. citizenship.”
absence of a conviction or a ﬁnding
The thrust of the debate is the big
that a conviction constitutes a crime
question of line drawing—who is “in”
involving moral turpitude, DHS policy guidelines suggest and who is “out” and, just as important, who has the right to
that if the violation occurred in the distant past and the decide. In the context of voting rights, the debate centers on
individual can establish good moral character “in spite of the issue of voter fraud. Anti-immigrant advocacy groups
making a false claim to U.S. citizenship,” the adjudicator and media personalities frequently allege that noncitizen
may exercise her discretion favorably, though DHS voting is undermining the integrity of the electoral process
guidelines set the bar fairly high.141 If the adjudicator and manipulating election outcomes.150 These voices use fear
denies the application, the noncitizen must apply for of widespread voter fraud by noncitizens to gain support
administrative review of the decision within thirty days.142 for stricter immigration policies.151 The false claims and
If she fails on the second review, as a last resort, the unlawful voter provisions validate and legitimize those fears,
applicant can petition a federal district court to conduct regardless of the real—de minimis—extent of the problem.
a de novo review of her eligibility for naturalization.143
Those seeking to counter claims of widespread voter
It is impossible to tell how often voting-related false fraud by noncitizens frequently argue that voter fraud is rare,
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largely because the consequences of committing voter fraud especially if the noncitizen did so unknowingly.158 A single
are so disproportionate to the individual’s gain of a single fraudulent vote is not likely to undermine the integrity of the
vote.152 Though convincing, this argument is not alone electoral process, and yet, the consequences of deportation
sufﬁcient to counter arguments in favor of maintaining the to an individual are enormous.159 Neither agency discretion
IIRIRA provisions. For one, if noncitizen voter fraud is a nor the availability of forms of relief mitigates this fact.160
myth then the false claims and unlawful
For one, cancellation of removal and
voting provisions do no harm. Likewise, The tension between democratic norms other forms of removal relief are quite
one might argue, if noncitizens do of inclusion and the inherently exclusive limited in their availability.161 Second,
commit voter fraud, then the provisions function of immigration law may never in both cases, the adjudicator—
are necessary as a deterrent in the
either an immigration judge or an
be
fully
resolved.
rational actor’s cost-beneﬁt analysis.
agency ofﬁcial—is choosing between
There are several responses, however,
imposing the sanction or not imposing
162
that highlight both the irrationality and the destructive effect the sanction.
Thus, the exercise of discretion does not
of IIRIRA’s false claims and unlawful voting provisions. “inject proportionality” into the immigration system, simply
First, even if noncitizens are voting or registering put, because there are no alternative sanctions available.163
to vote, studies have largely debunked the myth that
Lastly, even if noncitizen voting is rare, the IIRIRA
153
noncitizen voting has improperly inﬂuenced elections.
false claims and unlawful voting provisions are far from
Those individuals who violate election laws likely do so benign. For one, the provisions apply not only to those
unintentionally. Either they believe they are citizens, who vote, but also to those who register to vote.164 Those
or they are not aware that only citizens can vote. Many noncitizens that are found inadmissible or removable
noncitizens may register to vote, at the DMV for example, for either violation are equally negatively impacted—they
but never actually cast a vote, in which case they have no may be denied immigration beneﬁts and face possible
In addition, the provisions bolster the
effect on the outcome of elections. There have been a few deportation.165
154
In rhetoric of anti-immigration advocates. Perhaps most
incidents or allegations of larger-scale voter fraud.
those types of cases, however, individual noncitizens are disturbing, however, is their symbolic import. In essence,
led to believe they can vote by trusted community-based the IIRIRA provisions use elections, the symbol of the
organizations. These situations are likely to be rare. Even democratic process itself, to enforce immigration law. It
where noncitizens face draconian enforcement measures, is difﬁcult to imagine what could be further from the
like what is currently happening in Arizona,155 immigrant aspirational view of democracy as “citizenship as presence.”166
advocacy groups are unlikely to risk the political and
criminal consequences of encouraging noncitizens to vote
c. An Improper Role for Immigration Law
when alternate methods of advocacy exist. Thus, as long
as advocacy groups are aware of the voter restrictions, they
The tension between democratic norms of inclusion
are unlikely to use noncitizen voting as a strategic tool. and the inherently exclusive function of immigration law
Second, the IIRIRA provisions are not necessary to may never be fully resolved. Still, as Motomura suggests in
deter voter fraud. The laws likely do not factor into the his analysis of three different conceptions of immigration
individual’s decisional calculus because most noncitizens, law, society can choose the degree to which it incorporates
and even many immigration attorneys, are not aware of notions of equality into the immigration system.167
the consequences of making a false claim to citizenship or Regardless of a society’s ultimate decision to incorporate
even what making a false claim entails.156 Even assuming noncitizens into the political process, the body politic has
that noncitizens are aware of the consequences of a duty to ensure that U.S. immigration law both serves the
making a false claim in the context of voting, the threat needs of society and reﬂects societal ideals.168 In this respect,
of deportation or denial of immigration beneﬁts is not IIRIRA’s provisions represent a huge step backwards.
necessary to deter noncitizens. Noncitizens who knowingly
Motomura’s call to view immigration as transition
commit voter fraud can be prosecuted under existing requires revisiting the idea of extending voting rights to
state and federal laws, which impose signiﬁcant penalties noncitizens.169 For Motomura, “immigration as transition
for unlawful voting.157 Immigration law can then treat means treating lawful immigrants as Americans in waiting
these convictions the same way they treat all convictions. from their ﬁrst day in this country.”170 Because immigration
From a deterrence perspective, it is simply not necessary as transition presumes full equality for LPRs who intend
to create separate grounds of inadmissibility and removal. to naturalize,171 logically, this leads to the conclusion that
Using deportation to sanction noncitizens for voting LPRs should have some voting rights.172 Raskin and others
or registering to vote is grossly disproportionate to the offense, have convincingly argued that LPRs should be allowed to
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vote in local elections.173 Motomura echoes these proposals
There are numerous problems with this rationale in
with the qualiﬁcation that voting rights for LPRs should be the case of the false claims and unlawful voting provisions.
temporally limited to the ﬁve-year period during which they First, the terms of the contract are unclear—what is a “false
are not allowed to naturalize.174 Motomura’s proposal to claim to citizenship” anyway?184 Second, at least in the case
view immigration as transition bears signiﬁcant resemblance of the unlawful voting provision, which applies retroactively,
to the history of noncitizen voting in the U.S. as described by noncitizens do not get notice.185 Third, noncitizens may
Raskin. For Motomura, immigration law could do a better not reasonably expect to be denied immigration beneﬁts
job of recognizing the role of LPRs in modern American or deported for voting or merely registering to vote.
society (“citizenship as standing”).175 In addition, extending Motomura echoes the concerns, discussed above, about
the franchise to LPRs serves the
the inadequacy of cancellation of
practical function of “foster[ing] civic
removal and discretion for preserving
From an advocacy perspective,
education and involvement as aspects of
fairness.186 Lastly, noncitizens have
these provisions should be a
integration and transition to citizenship”
little choice over the terms.187 While
176
(“citizenship
as
integration”).
Motomura highlights the unequal
wake-up call.
Prior to the enactment of
bargaining power of noncitizens visIIRIRA, noncitizen voting in the
à-vis many aspects of the immigration
U.S. most closely resembled Motomura’s second concept system, nowhere is this more clearly reﬂected than in the
of immigration as afﬁliation. The logic of immigration IIRIRA provisions: noncitizens may be deported for
as afﬁliation prescribes that lawful immigrants gain rights participating, even unknowingly, in the process through
proportionate to their length of time in the country.177 In which their political rights are denied in the ﬁrst place.
a system that is mostly based on the afﬁliation concept, In that sense, the IIRIRA provisions are doubly punitive.
the importance of naturalization is deemphasized since
While these provisions make up only a small part
LPRs eventually gain most of the rights of citizenship.178 of the immigration system as a whole, they are nevertheless
Motomura points out that in certain European countries that important because of the values they reﬂect. The provisions’
closely ﬁt the immigration as afﬁliation model of citizenship, attempt to validate the concerns of some citizens that the
resident noncitizens are allowed to vote in local elections.179 line between citizen and noncitizen has grown blurry risks
If naturalization is a priority in the U.S., under the afﬁliation further marginalizing noncitizens from the political process.
rationale, it makes sense to withhold certain rights, such as Noncitizens have the right to participate politically through
the right to vote, in order to provide noncitizens with the grassroots organizing and other informal channels.188
incentive to naturalize.180 The withholding of voting rights, Even if one accepts the premise that denying noncitizens
however, is only justiﬁed so long as noncitizens actually the right to vote is a legitimate part of self-deﬁnition in
beneﬁt from other constitutional protections.181 While it is a democracy, the IIRIRA provisions go one step too far
debatable whether the rights of noncitizens were sufﬁciently in that they deny noncitizens even the potential to have
protected prior to the enactment of IIRIRA, when noncitizen a voice—formal or informal. In Motomura’s words, “In
voting rights were governed exclusively by election law (with the context of national self-deﬁnition, focusing only on
criminal sanctions attached), the balance, though perhaps promises, notice, and expectations is too narrowly utilitarian
not ideal, was still justiﬁable under democratic principles. and cavalier in its dismissal of equality, even where, as in
The landscape changed with the enactment of immigration and citizenship, some inequality is assumed.”189
IIRIRA, which essentially gave immigration law a role to play
in regulating noncitizen voting. This aspect of immigration V. Time for Radical Reform?: The Meaning of
law now most fully embodies the view of immigration as
“Citizenship” for Noncitizens
contract, with the grounds of inadmissibility and removal
representing the “terms” of the contract. Before, noncitizens
As currently written, the IIRIRA false claims
who voted unlawfully had only to suffer the criminal and unlawful voting provisions solidly reject the notion
consequences, though still severe, of their actions. Now, the of “citizenship as presence.” This paper has argued that
fact that a noncitizen voted or registered to vote is by itself, these provisions have threatened rather than protected
sufﬁcient grounds for terminating that individual’s “contract” American democratic ideals. There are many easy ﬁxes
to remain in the United States.182 The contract theory of that could mitigate their effects to some degree. Congress
immigration, as described by Motomura, is premised on could amend the provisions to explicitly incorporate
the notion that fairness and justice can be achieved through a speciﬁc intent requirement, or make an immigrant
notice, promise, and expectations, rather than through any waiver available, similar to one that exists for fraud and
assumption that noncitizens are entitled to equal rights.183 misrepresentation. In the end, however, these solutions
12
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do not go far enough. If naturalization and integration
are main goals of the immigration system, immigration law
cannot treat formal citizenship as an impermeable border.
At the very least, the provisions must be removed. Even
then, more is required to transition to a system that more
fully accounts for the true role of noncitizens in society. 190
From an advocacy perspective, these provisions
should be a wake-up call. Certainly, for the time being,
immigration attorneys must pay greater attention to the
implications of these provisions for their individual clients.
But, the provisions raise even greater issues in the context
of immigration reform: in whatever form it is likely to take,
it is ironic that those most likely to be affected do not have a
formal voice in the process. Advocacy groups should push
for the removal of these provisions, which both literally and
symbolically silence the noncitizen voice. Advocates should
also consider pushing for more radical reform, perhaps
even going so far as to reinvigorate the noncitizen suffrage
movement. Given the growing political inﬂuence of recently
naturalized citizens, 191 the time may soon be right for such
a movement, even if its scope is limited to voting rights at
the local level.192 In the end, if the project of self-deﬁnition
excludes individuals like the one whose story began this
paper, we have to question the validity of the project.
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